Orbuculumbeta

Drexel University

Philadelphia, PA
FY 2022-23 fragility
98
/ 100
high

Composite Fragility Score over time

Pillar trajectories

Operating Margin
(Operating revenue − operating expenses) / operating revenue. Industry-standard debt-rating heuristics — Fitch-style bands for privates, Moody's-aligned for publics. Score reflects current year and 3-year rolling average — single positive years don't erase chronic distress.
Pricing Power
Real net tuition revenue per FTE, 5-year change. Falling real net tuition + rising discount rate = market rejection of value proposition. Discount rate is the all-student institutional rate (F2C05 + F2C06 funded + unfunded grants over gross tuition); schools typically publish a first-time-in-college rate which runs 5-10 points higher.
Debt Burden
Viability ratio (expendable net assets / plant debt) with debt-acceleration penalty. Catches schools whose covenants are at risk because of recent debt issuance.
Amber dot = unusual single-year shift; smoothed metric attenuates impact. Hover for context.
Liquidity
Days cash on hand. Tuition-collapse override prevents 'deathbed cash' from misleading the score (high cash from emergency relief while school is shrinking).
Amber dot = unusual single-year shift; smoothed metric attenuates impact. Hover for context.

Institutional debt per student

Total institutional long-term debt (not student loans) divided by full-time-equivalent enrollment, nominal dollars. For public-university systems with centralized bond debt (UC, FL SUS), the system pool is allocated across sibling campuses proportional to FTE.

Long-term debt per FTE student · FY 2022-23
$25,273
$534.8M total debt ÷ 21,160 FTE
IPEDS-reported debt / FTE · trend
16% since FY 2007-08 ($21,832)

Latest-year debt per FTE student includes IPEDS-reported plant debt plus the LLM-enriched DSO snapshot (off-balance-sheet bonds at affiliated entities — typically FY 2024 audit values). For schools in public systems not yet in our curated map (CSU, UT, TAMUS, etc.), the system pool is currently attributed entirely to the flagship campus per the dedupe pass; per-student numbers at those flagships are overstated until allocation is added. The trajectory line shows IPEDS-reported debt only (no DSO) for consistency across years — DSO is a single audit-year snapshot, not a time series.

Tuition discount rate

The share of gross tuition revenue that’s offset by institutional grant aid (scholarships funded from the operating budget plus endowed scholarships). A rising discount rate combined with falling real net tuition is the canonical signal that a school is buying enrollment with aid that the market won’t support.

Tuition discount rate · FY 2022-23
40.5%
$416.9M institutional aid ÷ $1029.4M gross tuition
Discount rate · trend
19.0 pts since FY 2004-05 (21.5%)

Institutional grant aid (F2C05 funded + F2C06 unfunded) divided by gross tuition revenue (F2D01 net tuition + grants). This is the all-student, institution-wide rate. Schools and NACUBO typically publish a first-time-in-college (FTIC) freshman rate, which runs 5–10 points higher because recruitment merit aid is front-loaded onto incoming classes and steps down for upperclassmen.

Administrative spending

Institutional Support (administration) measured two ways, from IPEDS expense-by-function reporting: as a share of total operating expenses alongside Instruction (faculty/teaching), and indexed against net tuition revenue to show whether admin spending tracks the revenue that funds it.

Admin: 14.0% → 15.8% · Instruction: 30.1% → 42.3%

Instruction and Institutional Support as a share of total operating expenses. Instruction is the IPEDS faculty/teaching proxy; Institutional Support is the administrative proxy (executive management, finance, HR, general admin). A narrowing gap means admin is gaining on teaching.

Notes

Editorial context drawn from manual review of this school’s data, methodology interactions, and external reporting.

Score 98 reflects real multi-pillar deterioration, not a data artifact

Added 2026-04-27

Verified clean: F2I05 ($226M) is 38% of F2A04 ($596M) — well within the normal 20-50% envelope, no F2I05 anomaly. The composite of 98 in FY 2022-23 reflects genuine signals across every pillar: (1) operating margins thin or negative for most of the post-FY 2017 era (FY 2017 -2.3%, FY 2019 -8.8%, FY 2020 -3.5%, FY 2022 -3.1%); (2) real net tuition per FTE declined from $35K in FY 2012-13 to $29K in FY 2022-23, a 17% real-dollar decline over a decade; (3) viability ratio fell from 1.55 in FY 2017-18 to 0.42 today — plant debt grew while expendable assets eroded; (4) days cash on hand dropped from 235 days in FY 2017-18 to 79 days in FY 2022-23; (5) compounding-fragility bonus (+10) fires because 3+ pillars worsened over the trailing 3-year window. Enrollment dropped 11% from AY 2015-16 (24,293) to AY 2021-22 (21,532). The endowment backstop ($966M endowment, ~$96M accessible) provides partial relief — burn ratio is 0.63 putting it in the 'buffer significantly drawn' zone with relief halved. Real-world context aligns: Drexel announced major staff buyouts, layoffs, and the Salus University merger over 2023-2024.

Latest-year breakdown (FY 2022-23)

PillarRaw MetricScore
Operating Margin2.1%22 / 25
Pricing Power$32,497 real net tuition / FTE25 / 25
Debt Burden0.42 viability ratio25 / 25
Liquidity79 days cash on hand16 / 25

Peer schools

Closest by Fragility Score in FY 2022-23. Financial similarity only — geographic / regional clustering is a separate (future) feature.

Selected raw financials — FY 2022-23

FASB / IPEDS Finance F2.

Total revenue (F2B01)
$1.09B
Total expenses (F2B02)
$1.04B
Net tuition revenue (F2D01)
$612.6M
Endowment EOY (F2H02)
$966.3M
Plant debt (F2I06 / F2A03A)
$534.8M
Expendable net assets (F2I05)
$226.5M
Interest expense (F2E136)
$18.2M
Depreciation (F2E135)
$58.7M