University of Central Florida

Orlando, FL

FY 2023-24 fragility

/ 100

moderate

Composite Fragility Score over time

Pillar trajectories

Operating Margin

(Operating revenue − operating expenses) / operating revenue. Industry-standard debt-rating heuristics — Fitch-style bands for privates, Moody's-aligned for publics. Score reflects current year and 3-year rolling average — single positive years don't erase chronic distress.

Amber dot = unusual single-year shift; smoothed metric attenuates impact. Hover for context.

Pricing Power

Real net tuition revenue per FTE, 5-year change. Falling real net tuition + rising discount rate = market rejection of value proposition. Discount rate is the all-student institutional rate (F2C05 + F2C06 funded + unfunded grants over gross tuition); schools typically publish a first-time-in-college rate which runs 5-10 points higher.

Amber dot = unusual single-year shift; smoothed metric attenuates impact. Hover for context.

Debt Burden

Viability ratio (expendable net assets / plant debt) with debt-acceleration penalty. Catches schools whose covenants are at risk because of recent debt issuance.

Amber dot = unusual single-year shift; smoothed metric attenuates impact. Hover for context.

Liquidity

Days cash on hand. Tuition-collapse override prevents 'deathbed cash' from misleading the score (high cash from emergency relief while school is shrinking).

Amber dot = unusual single-year shift; smoothed metric attenuates impact. Hover for context.

Institutional debt per student

Total institutional long-term debt (not student loans) divided by full-time-equivalent enrollment, nominal dollars. For public-university systems with centralized bond debt (UC, FL SUS), the system pool is allocated across sibling campuses proportional to FTE.

Long-term debt per FTE student · FY 2023-24

$1,669

$99.0M total debt ÷ 59,317 FTE

IPEDS-reported debt / FTE · trend

▼ 61% since FY 2004-05 ($4,284)

Latest-year debt per FTE student includes IPEDS-reported plant debt plus the LLM-enriched DSO snapshot (off-balance-sheet bonds at affiliated entities — typically FY 2024 audit values). For schools in public systems not yet in our curated map (CSU, UT, TAMUS, etc.), the system pool is currently attributed entirely to the flagship campus per the dedupe pass; per-student numbers at those flagships are overstated until allocation is added. The trajectory line shows IPEDS-reported debt only (no DSO) for consistency across years — DSO is a single audit-year snapshot, not a time series.

Athletics & enrollment

Share of undergrads who play varsity sports (EADA, U.S. Dept of Education). A rising ratio over time at a tuition-dependent private is the “athletic ratchet” — adding sports or expanding rosters to fill seats as enrollment pressure mounts. Snapshots taken at ~6-year intervals.

Varsity athletes as reported · AY 2024-25

1.0%

423 athletes ÷ 42,128 UG
NCAA Division I-FBS

% athletes · trend (3 snapshots)

▼ 0.7 pts since AY 2005-06 (1.7%)

Coaching footprint · AY 2024-25

14 head + 45 assistant = 59 total

1 coach per 7.2 reported athletes

Typical varsity-only programs run 6–10 athletes per coach. Ratios well below that often reveal off-roster recruiting pools (JV, developmental, club with serious recruiting) that don’t show up in EADA’s varsity headcount.

What EADA counts: a student who participated in at least one intercollegiate (varsity) competition during the academic year. Excludes redshirts, JV / developmental rosters, and club sports. The actual athletic-recruit footprint can be substantially larger than this count. At D3 schools, “athletic aid” reads $0 in EADA because institutional merit aid that functions as recruitment subsidy isn’t classified as athletic aid — so the discount-rate signal on this page is the right place to look for that money.

Peer-anchored estimated total athletes

1.0%

≈ 420 implied athletes ÷ 42,128 UG
vs 1.0% reported (423)
kept-peer range suggests 1–1% (412–436 athletes)

roughly in line with peer expectations

Algorithmic peers · trimmed mean 7.1:1 (kept range 7.0:1–7.4:1)

Peer	UG	Ratio
Purdue University-Main CampusIN	41,893	7.4:1
Pennsylvania State University-Main CampusPA(trimmed)	41,448	7.8:1
Ohio State University-Main CampusOH	42,955	7.0:1
The University of Texas at AustinTX(trimmed)	40,554	6.7:1
Michigan State UniversityMI	38,406	7.0:1

Peers chosen by similarity score: same control + NCAA division weighted highest, plus Carnegie classification and UG enrollment band. The highest and lowest peer ratios are trimmed before averaging so one outlier doesn’t shift the range; the implied range is the school’s coach count multiplied by the kept peers’ min and max ratios, capped at UG enrollment.

Administrative spending

Institutional Support (administration) measured two ways, from IPEDS expense-by-function reporting: as a share of total operating expenses alongside Instruction (faculty/teaching), and indexed against net tuition revenue to show whether admin spending tracks the revenue that funds it.

Admin: 4.1% → 5.1% · Instruction: 30.9% → 32.7%

Instruction and Institutional Support as a share of total operating expenses. Instruction is the IPEDS faculty/teaching proxy; Institutional Support is the administrative proxy (executive management, finance, HR, general admin). A narrowing gap means admin is gaining on teaching.

Student-to-admin ratio · AY 2023-24

45.2:1

59,317 student FTE ÷ 1,312 full-time admin

146% above Carnegie peer average — leaner than peers

Carnegie reference

18.4:1

R1: Doctoral, Very High Research · n=107

Mean students-per-admin across schools in the same Carnegie classification (target excluded). Higher means leaner administrative footprint.

What “admin” means here: Management (OCCUPCAT 300) + Business and Financial Operations (OCCUPCAT 310) full-time staff — the “decision-making admin” headcount. Source: IPEDS S2023_OC survey (Fall 2023). This is a headcount metric, not a dollar metric, so it isn’t contaminated by regional salary differences. Not part of the fragility score; surfaced as descriptive context only.

Program earnings outcomes

From the HEA Group’s January 2026 release of program-level earnings data used in AHEAD negotiations. Each tested program is checked against a same-state high-school-graduate earnings benchmark; programs also subject to OBBBA Gainful Employment lose Title IV eligibility on a fail and are flagged AT RISK.

Earnings by Program

Median earnings 4 years post-completion vs the earnings benchmark.

Benchmark

$32,488

FL HS-only median

Computer Engineering
Bachelor · 65 completers in earnings cohort
PASS +74K
Electrical Electronics and Communications Engineering
Bachelor · 86 completers in earnings cohort
PASS +67K
Computer and Information Sciences General
Bachelor · 302 completers in earnings cohort
PASS +66K
Aerospace Aeronautical and Astronautical/Space Engineering
Bachelor · 64 completers in earnings cohort
PASS +64K
Industrial Engineering
Bachelor · 40 completers in earnings cohort
PASS +59K

Source: HEA Group Jan 2026 release using AHEAD-negotiations data. Pooled 2017-18 + 2018-19 completer cohorts; earnings measured CY 2022-23, inflation-adjusted to 2024 (CPI-U). Only programs with sufficient Title-IV completers appear in the test. “AT RISK” = fails the OBBBA Gainful Employment threshold — loss of Title IV eligibility likely, program likely closes.

Notes

Editorial context drawn from manual review of this school’s data, methodology interactions, and external reporting.

Florida tuition freeze drives system-wide pricing-power signal

Added 2026-04-26

The Florida State University System has not raised in-state undergraduate tuition since 2014 by legislative direction. With ~30% cumulative inflation since then, real net tuition per FTE has fallen materially across the system — most FL SUS schools transitioned from a pricing-power score of 0 (growing real tuition) through 2018 to a 25 (>10% real decline) by 2020-21. That contributes a full 25 of 100 points to most FL SUS composites in recent years. The signal is real (revenue per student is materially lower in inflation-adjusted dollars) but policy-driven rather than a market rejection of value — applies system-wide, not as a school-specific finding. FSU is the rare exception (pricing-power 0 in FY 2022-23), likely from non-resident or graduate-program tuition mix offsetting the in-state freeze.

Latest-year breakdown (FY 2023-24)

Pillar	Raw Metric	Score
Operating Margin	23.7%	0 / 25
Pricing Power	$4,878 real net tuition / FTE	25 / 25
Debt Burden	7.98 viability ratio	0 / 25
Liquidity	169 days cash on hand	8 / 25

Peer schools

Closest by Fragility Score in FY 2023-24. Financial similarity only — geographic / regional clustering is a separate (future) feature.

Less fragile

Schools scoring below

More fragile

Schools scoring above

Selected raw financials — FY 2023-24

GASB / IPEDS Finance F1A. DSO totals from LLM enrichment of audited financial statements; see /sources for citations.

Total revenue (F1B27)

$1.44B

Total expenses (F1C191)

$1.45B

Net tuition revenue (F1B01)

$287.0M

Auxiliary enterprises revenue (F1B05)

$114.0M

State appropriations (F1B11)

$482.5M

Endowment EOY (F1H02)

$201.9M

Long-term debt (F1A10)

$99.0M

Expendable net position (F1N05)

$789.8M

Interest expense (F1C19IN)

$4.8M

DSO debt — campus-specific

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DSO debt — system-level pool

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